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Abstract
In recent works we have defined a general framework for the validation of parameterized
concurrent systems based on the combination of multiset rewriting and constraints. The
class of systems we are interested in consists of concurrent systems parametric in the num-
ber of individual components.
Our framework provides the following features: (1) a specification language for the class
of concurrent systems taken into consideration; (2) an assertional language to finitely repre-
sent infinite sets of configurations; and (3) a sound and fully automatic verification method
based on symbolic state exploration.
The verification procedure has been implemented in a Constraint Logic Programming
systems, namely Sicstus Prolog and the clp(Q,R) library. CLP provides in fact all nec-
essary operations to manipulate multisets and constraints both as uninterpreted and inter-
preted objects. Operations over constraints are delegated in fact to the clp(Q,R) library, and
encapsulated into Sicstus Prolog predicates. The method can be applied to solve validation
problems for communication protocols, and (potentially) of security and authentication
protocols and abstractions of concurrent programs.
In this paper we overview the main features of our framework and comment on some of
the more interesting applications.
1 Introduction
In this paper we describe a general framework for the automatic verification of
concurrent systems parametric in the number of individual components. Our frame-
work extends multiset rewriting over first order atomic formulas (MSR), a paradigm
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proposed in [11], with the notion of constraints peculiar of Constraint Logic Pro-
gramming [22]. While multiset rewriting allows to specify concurrent processes
in a natural way, constraints can be used to declaratively represent the relation-
ship among their internal data. The combination of multisets and constraints is
also important to define symbolic data structures to represent infinite sets of system
configurations.
The relationship between multiset rewriting and concurrency can be well illus-
trated by reasoning in terms of Petri Nets. Petri Nets can be viewed in fact as mul-
tiset rewriting systems defined over a finite alphabet Σ. The symbols in Σ represent
the set of places of a Petri Net. A Petri Net marking can be modeled as a multi-
set of symbols from Σ: k occurrences of the symbol p in the multiset correspond
to k tokens in the place p. As a consequence, Petri Net transitions can be mod-
eled as multiset rewriting rules over symbols in Σ. Finally, a sequence of rewriting
steps can be viewed as the sequence of markings generating by an execution of the
corresponding Petri Net.
Multiset rewriting over first-order atomic formulas (MSR) [11] naturally ex-
tends this connection to Petri Nets with colored tokens, the colors being first-order
terms attached to atomic formulas representing tokens. It is important to note that in
this setting rewriting is restricted to multisets of atomic formulas only. Intuitively, a
multiset of atomic formulas is interpreted as a pool of active and concurrently exe-
cuting processes. Atomic formulas denote the current state of individual processes.
In [14,8], we proposed a generalization of the MSR formalism in which multiset
rewriting rules (over first-order atomic formulas) are annotated with constraints.
The resulting language scheme, called MSR(
C ), is parametric on the constraint
system C . MSR(C ) provides a clear separation between process structure and
declarations of data relations. One of the advantages of this conceptual separation
is a major modularity of the resulting specifications.
The logic obtained by combining multisets and constraints can be naturally
used to reason about system properties. Specifically, several correctness proper-
ties can be verified by searching for error traces following the so-called backward
reachability search scheme. The idea here is to first isolate the set of configurations
that represent possible violations and then to generate all possible preconditions
for those configurations to occur. If the initial states do not satisfy any of those
preconditions than the violations will never occur, and thus the system is proved to
be correct.
A particularly interesting class of safety properties are those whose violations
can be expressed via upward-closed sets of configurations, i.e., that can be repre-
sented via minimal violations. Our symbolic representation of upward-closed sets
of configurations is based on the notion of constrained configuration introduced in
[14] to deal with asynchronous systems, i.e. multisets of first-order atomic formu-
las, annotated with constraints.
Multisets represent minimal requirements about the distribution of tokens in the
net, whereas constraints provide a natural symbolic representation for relations over
data of different processes. Based on this rich assertional language, we provide
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symbolic operations needed to implement backward reachability, namely we define
a symbolic predecessor operator, which is sound and complete for any constraint
system.
The interest of this method is that allows to study properties that do not depend
on the number of processes generated during a computation. We will clarify this
point in this survey by discussing the application to a mutual exclusion protocol
designed for client-server systems in which the number of clients is not bounded a
priori.
We have implemented our automated verification method and applied it to ana-
lyze several practical case-studies. In general the method works without guarantees
of termination. However, several techniques like static analysis and abstract inter-
pretation can be applied to enforce termination on specific case studies. Further-
more, soundness ensures that error-traces will eventually be found: the prototype
we used to implement the method performs a breadth-first symbolic backward ex-
ploration of the state space. Termination can be shown only for special subclasses
of MSR(C )-specifications [15].
As an implementation platform we have used a Constraint Logic Programming
system, namely the clp(Q,R) library of Sicstus Prolog. CLP provides built-in op-
erations and data structures to implement multiset-based operations (unification,
efficient list representations and operations). Furthermore, it allows to handle con-
straints both as interpreted and uninterpreted objects. When queried, the clp(Q,R)
solver provides operations like satisfiability, entailment, and projections that (via
the encapsulation predicates peculiar of Sictus Prolog) can be embedded into pro-
cedure used for symbolic backward search.
In this paper we will give an overview of the general framework, the corre-
sponding verification methodology. Finally, we will discuss issues about the CLP
implementation and some of practical applications of the framework.
2 Constraint Multiset Rewriting
The framework called MSR is based on multiset rewriting systems defined over
first-order atomic formulas and it has been introduced by Cervesato et al. [11] for
the formal specification of cryptographic protocols. In [14], the basic formalism
(i.e., without existential quantification) has been extended to allow for the speci-
fication of relations over data variable using constraints, i.e. a logic language in-
terpreted over a fixed domain. Multiset rewriting rules allow one to locally model
rendez-vous and internal actions of processes, and constraints to symbolically rep-
resent the relation between the data of different processes, thus achieving a clear
separation between process structure and data paths. This formalism can be viewed
as a first-order extension of Petri Nets in which tokens carry along structured data.
We will call the resulting formalism MSR(C ). First of all, we introduce the notion
of constraint system.
67
Delzanno
2.1 Constraint Systems
A constraint system is a tuple C = hV ;L ; D ;S ; vci where:
(i) V is a denumerable set of variables;
(ii) L is a first-order language (the assertional language) defining a set of formu-
las with free variables in V (the constraints), closed with respect to variable
renaming, existential quantification and conjunction, and allowing equalities
between variables;
(iii) D is a possibly infinite set (the interpretation domain);
(iv) S (ϕ) is a set of mappings V !D (the set of solutions of a constraint ϕ 2L )
that preserves the usual semantics of equalities, ^ and 9 (intersection and
projection of the solutions);
(v) vc is a relation such that ϕvc ψ impliesS (ψ)S (ϕ) (the entailment rela-
tion: we say that ψ entails ϕ).
We assume that L contains constraints, denoted ‘true’, and ‘ f alse’, which are
identically true and identically false in D .
By analogy with constraint programming, further requirements on constraint
systems, like solution compactness [22], can be imposed. We refer to [22] for a
discussion.
In the rest of the paper, we often denote the conjunction between constraints with a
simple comma. We refer to a generic mapping σ : V !D as an evaluation for the
variables in V . We use the notation hx1 7! d1;x2 7! d2; : : :i to denote an evaluation
σ mapping x1 to d1, x2 to d2, and so on, and the notation σ
jx to denote the restriction
of the evaluation σ to the variables x. We also say that a constraint ϕ is satisfiable
ifS (ϕ) 6= /0.
Example 2.1 The class of linear integer constraints consists of formulas generated
by the following grammar
ϕ ::= ϕ^ϕ j a1x1+ : : :+anxn = an+1 j a1x1+ : : :+anxn > an+1 j true j f alse
where ai 2 Z for i : 1; : : : ;n+ 1. LC-constraints are interpreted over Z; vc is the
usual entailment relation for linear integer constraints.
Note that there exists several methods for checking satisfiability, entailment,
and for variable elimination (see e.g. [10]) over linear arithmetic constraints.
Example 2.2 Let ϕ be x > y^ x > z, then σ = hx 7! 2;y 7! 1;z 7! 0; : : :i 2S (ϕ).
Furthermore, ϕ is satisfiable, (x > y)vc ϕ, and 9y:ϕ (x > z).
We are now ready to define the framework of multiset rewriting with con-
straints.
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2.2 The MSR(C ) language
In the following we will use the notion of multisets. We use  and 	 to denote
multiset union and multiset difference, respectively.
Let P be a finite set of predicate symbols, and V a denumerable set of variables.
An atomic formula over P and V has the form p(x1; : : : ;xn) (with n  0), where
p 2P , and x1; : : : ;xn are distinct variables in V .
Now, let P be a finite set of predicate symbols, and V a denumerable set of vari-
ables. A multiset of atomic formulas A1, . . . , Ak (with k  1) over P and V , is
indicated as A1 j : : : j Ak, where Ai and A j must have distinct variables for i 6= j,
and j is an associative and commutative constructor. The empty multiset is denoted
by ε.
In the rest of the paper will use M , N , : : : to denote multisets of atomic formulas.
LetP be a finite set of predicate symbols, and C = hV ;L ;D ;S ;vci a constraint
system. An MSR(C ) rule overP and C has the form M  ! M 0 : ϕ, where M
and M 0 are two multisets of atomic formulas over P and V , with distinct vari-
ables, and ϕ 2L .
Note that M  ! ε : ϕ and ε  ! M : ϕ are possible MSR(C ) rules.
In order to make the intuitive semantics of the previous specification precise, we
introduce the ingredients for the operational reading of MSR rules. We first define
the notion of ground formulas. Let P be a finite set of predicate symbols, and
C = hV ;L ;D ;S ;v
c
i a constraint system. A ground atomic formulas over P
and C has the form p(d1; : : : ;dn) (with n 0), where p 2P and d1; : : : ;dn 2D .
In the following, we will denote by σ(M ) the application of a solution σ : V !D
to a multiset of atomic formulas M . Formally, σ(A1 j : : : j Ak)=σ(A1) j : : : jσ(Ak),
and σ(p(x1; : : : ;xm))= p(d1; : : : ;dm) if σ(xi)= di for xi 2 V and vi 2D , i : 1; : : : ;m.
Given an MSR(C ) rule R = M  ! M 0 : ϕ, over P and C , the set of ground
instances of R, denoted Inst(R), is the set of ground multiset rewrite rules defined
as follows:
Inst(R) = fσ(M )  ! σ(M 0) j σ 2S (ϕ)g
A central notion for our semantics is that of current configuration given below.
LetP be a finite set of predicate symbols, and C a constraint system. An MSR(C )
configuration is a multiset of ground atomic formulas overP and C .
Configurations can be ordered with respect multiset inclusion as follows. Given
two multisets of atomic formulas M 4N if and only if OccA(M )OccA(N ) for
every atomic formula A, where OccA(M ) denotes the number of occurrences of A
in M .
An MSR(C ) specification is defined as follows.
Definition 2.3 [MSR(C ) Specifications] An MSR(C ) specification is a tuple hP;C ;I ;Ri,
where
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
P is a finite set of predicate symbols,

C is a constraint system,

I is a set of configurations (the initial configurations),
 andR is a set of MSR(C ) rules overP and C .
The operational semantics of an MSR(C ) specification hP;C ;I ;Ri can be
defined as follows. Let M be a configuration. A rule H  ! B : ϕ from R
is enabled at M via the solution σ 2 S (ϕ) of the constraint ϕ if and only if
σ(H )4M .
Now, suppose R  H  ! B : ϕ is enabled at M via σ 2 S (ϕ). Firing this
rule at M yields the new configuration M 0, written M )R M 0, if and only if
M = σ(H )Q , and M 0 = σ(B)Q .
A run is a sequence of configurations M0M1M2 : : :Mi : : : with M0 2 I and for
which there exist R0R1 : : : 2R such that Mi )Ri Mi+1 for i  0.
Let S a set of configurations. The successor operator Post is defined as
Post(S) = fM 0 j M )R M 0; M 2 S; R 2Rg;
whereas, the predecessor operator Pre is defined as
Pre(S) = fM j M )R M 0; M 0 2 S; R 2Rg:
The reflexive and transitive closures of the predecessor and successor operators are
denoted Pre and Post, respectively.
The reachability set is defined as Post(I ),I being the initial states of the MSR(C )
specification under consideration.
2.3 An example: The Ticket Mutual Exclusion Protocol
The ticket protocol is a mutual exclusion protocol designed for multi-client sys-
tems operating on a shared memory. The protocol is based on a first-in first-served
access policy. The algorithm is given in Fig.1 (where we use P j Q to denote the
interleaving parallel execution of P and Q, and hi to denote atomic fragments of
code). The protocol works as follows. Initially, all clients are thinking, while t and
s store the same initial value. When requesting the access to the critical section, a
client stores the value of the current ticket t in its local variable a. A new ticket is
then emitted by incrementing t. Clients wait for their turn until the value of their
local variable a equals the value of s.
After the elaboration inside the critical section, a process releases it and the
current turn is updated by incrementing s. During the execution, the global state
of the protocol consists of the current values of s, t, and of the local variables of
n processes. As remarked in [10], even for n = 2 (only 2 clients), the values of
the local variables of individual processes as well as s and t may get unbounded.
This implies that any instance of the scheme of Fig. 1 gives rise to an infinite-state
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The system with n processes
Program
global var s; t : integer;
begin
t := 0;
s := 0;
P1 j : : : j Pn;
end:
The i-th component
Process Pi ::=
local var a : integer;
repeat forever
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
think : h a := t;
t := t+1; i
wait : when h a= s i do
use :
2
4
critical section
h s := s+1; i
end:
Fig. 1. The Ticket Protocol: n is a parameter of the protocol.
system. The algorithm is supposed to work for any value of n, and it should also
work if new clients enter the system at running time.
Multiset rewriting allows us to give an accurate and flexible encoding of the
ticket protocol.
Let us first consider a single shared resource controlled via the counters t and s
as described in Section 2.3. The infinite collection of admissible initial states con-
sists of all configurations with an arbitrary but finite number of thinking processes
and two counters having the same initial value (t = s). The specification is shown in
Fig. 2. The initial configuration is the predicate init, the seed of all possible runs of
the protocol. The counters are represented here via the atoms count(t) and turn(s).
Thinking clients are represented via the propositional symbol think, and can be
generated dynamically via the second rule. The behavior of an individual client is
described via the third block of rules of Fig. 2, in which the relation between the
local variable and the global counters are represented via DC-constraints. Finally,
we allow thinking processes to terminate their execution as specified via the last
rule of Fig. 2. The previous rules are independent of the current number of clients
in the system. Note that in our specification we keep an explicit representation of
the data variables; furthermore, we do not out any restrictions on their values. As a
consequence, there are runs of our model in which s and t grow without any bound
as in the original protocol. A sample run of a system with 2 clients (as in [10]) is
shown in Fig. 3.
Let us consider now an open system with an arbitrary but finite number of
shared resources, each one controlled by two local counters s and t. We specify this
scenario by associating a unique identifier to each resource and to use it to stamp
the corresponding pair of counters. Furthermore, we exploit non-determinism in
order to simulate the capability of each client to choose which resource to use. The
resulting specification is shown in Fig 4. We have considered an open system in
which new clients can be generated dynamically via a demon process. The process
demon(n) maintains a local counter n used to generate a new identifier, say id, and
to associate it to a newly created resource represented via the pair count(id; t) and
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Initial States
init  ! count(t) j turn(s) : t = s
Dynamic Generation
ε  ! think : true
Individual Behavior
think j count(t)  ! wait(a) j count(t0) : a = t ^ t0 = t +1
wait(a) j turn(s)  ! use j turn(s0) : a = s ^ s0 = s
use j turn(s)  ! think j turn(s0) : s0 = s+1
Termination
think  ! ε : true
Fig. 2. Ticket protocol for multi-client, single-server system, with an example of run.
init ) : : :) think j count(8) j turn(8)) think j think j count(8) j turn(8)
) wait(8) j think j count(9) j turn(8)) wait(8) j wait(9) j count(10) j turn(8)
) use j wait(9) j count(10) j turn(8)) use j wait(9) j count(10) j turn(8) j think
) think j wait(9) j count(10) j turn(9) j think
Fig. 3. Example of run.
turn(id;s). A thinking process non-deterministically chooses which resource to
wait for by synchronizing with one of the counters in the system (the first rule of
the third block in Fig. 4). After this choice, the algorithm behaves as usual w.r.t. to
the chosen resource id. The termination rules can be specified as natural extensions
of the single-server case. Note that in this specification the sources of infiniteness
are the number of clients, the number of shared resources, the values of resource
identifiers, and the values of tickets. An example of run is shown in Fig. 5.
3 An Assertional Language for MSR(C )
Since we can easily encode the formalism of two counters machines into MSR(C )
, reachability problems are in general undecidable for MSR(C ) specifications.
Even for fragments of MSR(C ) that are not Turing powerful, the reachability
set of an MSR(C ) specification might be infinite and thus it might be extremely
difficult to explore it. The source of infiniteness may be either the increasing size
(number of elements) of generated configurations, or the unboundedness of the
values attached to atomic formulas (e.g. think about a simple counter incremented
at every rule application), or both.
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Initial States
init  ! demon(n) : true
Dynamic Process and Server Generation
ε  ! think : true
demon(n)! demon(n0) j count(id; t) j turn(id 0;s) :
n0 = n+1 ^ t = s ^ id = n ^ id 0 = id
Individual Behavior
think j count(id; t)  ! think(r) j count(id 0; t 0) : r = id ^ id0 = id ^ t 0 = t
think(r) j count(id; t)  ! wait(r0;a) j count(id 0; t 0) :
r = id ^ a = t ^ t 0 = t+1 ^ r0 = r^ id0 = id
wait(r;a) j turn(id;s)  ! use(r0;a0) j turn(id0;s0) :
r = id ^ a = s ^ a0 = a ^ s0 = s^ r0 = r ^ id0 = id
use(r;a) j turn(id;s)  ! think j turn(id 0;s0) : r = id ^ s0 = s+1 ^ id0 = id
Termination
think(r)  ! ε : true
think  ! ε : true
Fig. 4. Ticket protocol for multi-server, multi-client systems.
init ) demon(3) ) count(3;0) j turn(3;0) j demon(4)) : : :
: : :) count(3;0) jturn(3;0) j think j think j demon(4)
) count(3;0) j turn(3;0) j count(4;8) jturn(4;8) j think j think j demon(5)) : : :
) count(3;0) j turn(3;0) j count(4;8) jturn(4;8) j think(4) j think(3) j demon(5)
) count(3;0) j turn(3;0) j count(4;9) jturn(4;8) j wait(4;8) j think(3) j demon(5):
Fig. 5. Example of run.
The only possibility of automatically analyzing the behavior of this infinite-
state specification consists of finding adequate finite, symbolic representations of
infinite collections of configurations. In order to achieve this goal, in this section
we will introduce an assertional language based on the notion of upward-closed
sets of configurations.
To explain this idea, let us consider again the Example 1. Suppose we are inter-
ested in proving that the specification of the example discussed in the previous sec-
tions satisfies the following invariant: all reachable states satisfy the mutual exclu-
sion property only one process per time is in state use. Instead of proving it directly,
we can try to disprove it as follows: we first select all possible configurations that
violate it, and then show that they are not reachable from the initial state init. The
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set of interesting violations U consists of configurations like use(v) j use(w)  U 0
where U 0 is any possible multiset. Then, we note that U can be generated from the
(infinite) set of configurations M = fuse(v) j use(w) v  0;w  0g by taking the
upward closure with respect to multiset inclusion: if a configuration contains any
ground instance of M, then it violates itself the invariant.
As discussed in [1], the negation of an invariant property often enjoys the prop-
erty of being upward closed with respect to an inclusion ordering defined over sets
of configurations. As a first approximation of the problem of exploring an infinite
state space, we could then start the exploration from the unsafe states, using mini-
mal violations to represent them, and reason backward by applying the predecessor
operator Pre (i.e., computing weakest pre-conditions). Let us formally define the
notion of upward closed sets.
Let hP;C ;I ;Ri be an MSR(C ) specification, and S a set of configurations. The
upward closure of S, denoted Up(S), is defined as
Up(S) = fN j M 4N ;M 2 Sg:
We say that S is upward closed if S = Up(S).
Upward-closed sets of configurations have interesting properties with respect
to the predecessor operator Pre.
Proposition 3.1 ([15]) U p(Pre(S)) Pre(U p(S)) for any set S of configurations.
In general the reverse implication does not hold.
Example 3.2 Consider p  ! q1 j q2 and the singleton set S consisting of the
multiset q1. Then, Pre(S) = /0, whereas the multiset p belongs to Pre(U p(S)).
However, the following property holds.
Corollary 3.3 ([15]) If S is upward-closed, then U p(Pre(S)) = Pre(U p(S)).
In other words, the class of upward-closed sets of configurations is closed under
the computation of the pre-image. The previous properties do not suffice to finitely
represent and manipulate sets upward closed sets of configurations. In fact, we
still have to solve the problem of finitely represent what we called the minimal
violations. This is not always possible. However, in the example of the single server
ticket algorithm they have a regular structure that we can exploit by translating the
extensional description
M = fuse(v) j use(w) v  0;w  0g
into the following intensional description, called a constrained configuration
use(x) j use(y) : true
where x;y are free variables. In other words, by annotating a non ground configura-
tion (i.e., in which formulas have free variables) with a constraint we can implicitly
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represent all unsafe configurations we are interested in for our example. They will
correspond to the upward closure of the set of ground instances of the constrained
configuration above. It is important to note that this techniques is just an heuristics
through which we try to embed as many configurations as possible inside a regular
structure. In the following section we will formalize these ideas and show how to
use them in combination with the backward reachability approach proposed in [1].
3.1 Symbolic Representation via Constrained Configurations
In order to finitely represent the generators of an upward closed set of configura-
tions, we use a rich assertional language based on the notion of constrained config-
urations, i.e. multisets of (non ground) atomic formulas annotated with constraints.
Let hP;C ;I ;Ri be an MSR(C ) specification, with C = hV ;L ;D ;S ;vci. A
constrained configuration is a multiset of atomic formulas over P and C , anno-
tated with a constraint, having the form
p1(x11; : : : ;x1k1) j : : : j pn(xn1 : : : ;xnkn) : ϕ
where p1; : : : ; pn 2P , ϕ 2L is a satisfiable constraint, and x11; : : : ;xnkn are dis-
tinct variables in V .
The set of ground instances of a constrained configuration can be defined as fol-
lows.
Let hP; C ; I ;Ri be an MSR(C ) specification, and M : ϕ a constrained config-
uration. The set of ground instances of M : ϕ is defined as
Inst(M : ϕ) = fσ(M ) j σ 2S (ϕ)g:
As an example, let C be the constrained configuration use(x) j user(y) : true.
Then, if LC-constraints are interpreted over non-negative integers Inst(C) contains
configurations like use(1) j use(2), use(4) j use(6), etc.
The previous definition can be extended to sets of constrained configurations (de-
noted S;S0; : : :) in the natural way:
Inst(S) =
[
C 2 S
Inst(C)
Following the intuition we explained in the previous section, instead of taking the
set of instances as flat denotation of a set of constrained configurations S, we choose
the following rich denotation.
Let hP; C ;I ;Ri be an MSR(C ) specification, and S a set of constrained config-
urations (with distinct variables from each other). The rich denotation of S, denoted
[[S]], is given by the upward closure of the set of its ground instances, i.e.
[[S]] = Up(Inst(S))
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Example 3.4 Let C be defined as use(x) j user(y) : true. Then, [[C]] contains
configurations like use(1) j use(2) as well as use(1) j use(2) j use(0), etc.
4 A Symbolic Verification Procedure
The next step toward an effective verification procedure consists of defining a sym-
bolic predecessor operator working on the assertional language according to the
rich denotation described in the previous section. Let us first introduce the notion
of unification between two multisets of atomic formulas (with distinct variables).
Firstly, given two atomic formulas A = p(x1; : : : ;xk) and B = q(y1; : : : ;yl), we use
A = B as a shorthand for the constraint x1 = y1^ : : :^ xk = yk, provided p = q and
k = l. Unification is defined then as follows.
Definition 4.1 Let M = A1 j : : : j An : ϕ, and N = B1 j : : : j Bm : ψ be two con-
strained configurations. We say that θ 2 L is a unifier for M and N , written
M =θ N , provided m = n, and the constraint
θ= ϕ^ψ^
n^
i=1
Ai = B ji
is satisfiable, j1; : : : ; jn being a permutation of 1; : : : ;n.
Below, given E (e.g., a rule, constraint, or constrained configuration) we call
E 0 a variant of E if E 0 is obtained applying a renaming ι to E, i.e. E 0 = ι(E) (a
renaming is a mapping from variables of E to fresh variables).
Definition 4.2 [The Pre Operator] The operator Pre is defined on a set S contain-
ing constrained multisets (with disjoint variables) as follows
Pre(S) = f (AN : 9x1: : : :xk:θ) j (A  ! B : ψ) 2R; (M : ϕ) 2 S;
M 0 4M ; B 0 4 B;
(M 0 : ϕ) =θ (B 0 : ψ);
N = M 	M 0;
and x1; : : : ;xk are all the variables
that do not occur in A N g:
Let us give an example of application.
Example 4.3 Consider the constrained configuration
p(x;y) ! q(x;y) : x 0;y = 1
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Given the singleton S with q(u;w) : u = 1;w  0, Pre(S) should contain
p(x;y) : x = 1;y = 1
as well as
p(x;y) j q(u;w) : x  0;y = 1;u = 1;w  0
e.g., p(4;1) j q(1;5) rewrites into q(4;1) j q(1;5) 2 [[S]].
The latter constrained configuration can be obtained by setting M 0 = B 0 = ε (the
empty multiset) when applying Pre to S.
The new operator enjoys the following property.
Theorem 4.4 ([15]) Let hP;C ;I ;Ri be an MSR(C ) specification and S a set of
constrained configurations (with distinct variables from each other). Then [[Pre(S)]] =
Pre([[S]]).
In order to define a symbolic reachability algorithm, we still need a comparison
operator between constrained configurations. We discuss next the general require-
ments it should satisfy.
Definition 4.5 Let hP;C ;I ;Ri be an MSR(C ) specification. We call a relation
v
m between constrained configurations (M;N; : : :) entailment relation whenever
M vm N implies [[N]] [[M]].
Based on this definition, we can define a symbolic backward reachability pro-
cedure that we can use to check safety properties whose negation can be expressed
via an upward closed set of configurations. We can rephrase the backward reach-
ability algorithm (which is parametric on the constraint system C and entailment
relation vm) in our setting, as follows.
Definition 4.6 Given an MSR(C ) specification hP;C ;I ;Ri, an entailment rela-
tion vm for constrained configurations, and a set U of constrained configurations
(with distinct variables from each other) representing a set of unsafe states, the
symbolic backward reachability procedure consists of the following two steps:
(i) we first compute Pre(U): starting from U, we repeatedly apply Pre to all
stored constrained configurations. We stop when it is not possible to store
new constrained configurations (i.e., for each new constrained configuration
M we already computed N such that N vm M);
(ii) if the fixpoint computation terminates we check that the initial configurations
I , representing the initial states of the system, are not contained in the deno-
tation of the resulting set of constrained configurations (i.e.,I \ [[Pre(U)]] =
/0).
The pseudo-code of the algorithm is given in Fig. 6.
In general, the algorithm is not terminating, since it is possible to encode un-
decidable reachability problems (e.g. for two counter machines) as verification
problems of generic MSR(C ) specifications. However, following [1,18], if we can
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Procedure Pre(U : set of constrained configurations)
S := U;
R := /0;
while S 6= /0 do
begin
remove (M : ϕ) from S;
if there are no (N : ψ) 2 R s:t: (M : ϕ) entails (N : ψ) then
add (M : ϕ) to R
S := S[Pre(fM : ϕg);
endif
end
endwhile
end:
Fig. 6. Symbolic Backward Reachability
prove that vm is a well-quasi ordering, then the previous procedure turns out to be
a complete algorithm to compute Pre([[U]]). In order to check that a safety prop-
erties holds we also need that the emptiness test for the intersection with the initial
states is decidable.
5 Implementation in CLP
Most CLP systems can be naturally used as implementation platform for the verifi-
cation methodology discussed in this paper. CLP systems like the clp(Q,R) library
of Sicstus Prolog provides both symbolic data structures to represent multiset-based
specification languages and encapsulation operators for handling constraints at the
object level. These features allowed us to implement a prototype in which MSR(C )
specifications are represented via unit clauses that combine terms with variables
and constraints like:
r([p(X);q(Y)]; [r(Z); t(W)];fX > Y;Z = Y;W = Y +1g):
Here a multiset is represented as a list of atomic formulas like [p(X);q(Y)] and a
constraints is represented (following the clp(Q,R) syntax) as a list of linear arith-
metic atomic constraints like fX > Y;Z = Y;W = Y +1g.
In this setting the symbolic predecessor and the entailment operator can be natu-
rally implemented by using unification (to handle multiset matching) and querying
the constraint solver (for checking satisfiability, for projection, and for entailment).
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This way, we must be able to transform constraints from uninterpreted terms to
active objects. Furthermore, we must be able to retrieve the results produced by
the constraint solver (that can be viewed as an oracle that puts its output on the
constraint store). The clp(Q,R) library provides special built-in predicates for this
sort of computations. Specifically, it provides a predicate that given a constraint in
input return its simplified form (if satisfiable). Furthermore, it provides predicates
that can be used to define (in the similar input output fashion) projection over indi-
vidual variables.
Using these features we have defined a library for handling (sets of) constrained
configurations and we have incorporate it within a least fixpoint engine with en-
tailment as termination test. The prototype has been used in several applications as
discussed in the following section.
6 Applications
As a first application we studied mutual exclusion properties for different formu-
lations of the ticket protocol. As shown in [10], this protocol has an infinite-state
space even for system configurations with only 2 processes. We have considered
both a multi-client, single-server formulation, i.e. with an arbitrary but finite num-
ber of dynamically generated clients but a single shared resource, and a multi-client,
multi-server system in which both clients and servers are created dynamically. Both
examples have been modeled using multiset rewriting rules with linear constraints,
that support arithmetic operations like increment and decrement of data variables.
Our models are faithful to the original formulation of the algorithm, in that we do
not abstract away global and local integer variables attached to individual clients
that in fact can still grow unboundedly. Using our symbolic backward reachability
procedure combined with the dynamic use of abstractions, we have automatically
verified that both models are safe for any number of clients and servers and for any
values of local and global variables [8].
The second application of our method was the analysis of a coherence protocol for
virtual shared memory proposed by Li and Hudak in [24] and previously analyzed
in [20]. Using our technique, we found an inconsistency in one of the Colored
Petri Nets model proposed in [20]. After having corrected the error, we have au-
tomatically verified a new model of the protocol in which the number of threads,
processors, and pages of virtual memory are unbounded parameters [8].
Finally, we have automatically validate coherence protocols for multiprocessors
systems (M.S.I., M.E.S.I., Synapse) in which number of processors, cache lines
and memory locations are left as unbounded parameters [15].
We are currently working on the application of this methodology to the validation
of security and authentication protocols and of abstraction of concurrent programs.
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7 Related Works
Our work is inspired to the approach of [2,4], where existential regions are pro-
posed as symbolic representation of configurations for parameterized Timed Petri
Nets. In our framework we consider however problems and constraint systems that
do not depend on the notion of time.
Networks of finite-state processes can be analyzed using the automata theoretic
approach of [7,12,23], where sets of global states are represented as regular lan-
guages, and transitions as relations on languages. Symbolic exploration can then
be performed using operations over automata with ad hoc accelerations or with au-
tomated abstractions techniques.
Differently from the automata theoretic approach, in our setting we handle param-
eterized systems in which individual components have local variables that range
over unbounded values. The previous features also distinguish our approach from
the verification with invisible invariants method of [5]. Contrary, we follow here the
paradigm of symbolic model checking with rich assertional languages [23], trying
to isolate decidable classes for which backward reachability terminates. The two
approaches can be used to attack similar problems using different point-of-views.
Our ideas are related to previous works connecting Constraint Logic Programming
and verification, see e.g. [16]. In this setting transition systems are encoded via
CLP programs used to encode the global state of a system and its updates. We re-
fine this idea by using multiset rewriting and constraints to locally specify updates
to the global state. The notion of constrained multiset extends that of constrained
atom of [16]. The locality of rules allows us to consider rich denotations (upward-
closures) instead of flat ones (instances) like, e.g., in [16]. This way, we can lift the
approach to the parameterized case.
Finally, the use of constraints, backward reachability, structural invariants and
better quasi orderings seem all ingredients that distinguish our hybrid method
from classical approaches based on multiset and AC rewriting techniques (see e.g.
[11,26]).
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